Entanglement purification with noisy apparatus can be used to factor out
  an eavesdropper by Aschauer, Hans & Briegel, Hans J.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
01
08
06
0v
1 
 1
3 
A
ug
 2
00
1
Entanglement purification with noisy apparatus can be used to
factor out an eavesdropper
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We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is
sufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel.
Our proof applies to all possible attacks (individual and coherent). Due to the
quantum nature of the entanglement purification protocol, it is also possible to use
the obtained quantum channel for secure transmission of quantum information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication exploits the quantum properties of its information carriers for
communication purposes such as the distribution of secure cryptographic keys in quantum
cryptography [1, 2] and the communication between distant quantum computers in a network
[3]. A central problem of quantum communication is how to faithfully transmit unknown
quantum states through a noisy quantum channel [4]. While information is sent through
such a channel (for example an optical fiber), the carriers of the information interact with
the channel, which gives rise to the phenomenon of decoherence and absorbtion; an initially
pure quantum state becomes a mixed state when it leaves the channel. For quantum commu-
nication purposes, it is however necessary that the transmitted qubits retain their genuine
quantum properties, for example in form of an entanglement with qubits on the other side
of the channel.
In quantum cryptography, noise in the communication channel plays a crucial role: In
the worst-case scenario, all noise in the channel is attributed to an eavesdropper, who ma-
nipulates the qubits in order to gain as much information on their state as possible, while
introducing only a moderate level of noise.
To deal with this situation, two different techniques have been developed: Classical pri-
vacy amplification allows the eavesdropper to have partial knowledge about the raw key
built up between the communicating parties Alice and Bob. From the raw key, a shorter
key is “distilled” about which Eve has vanishing (i. e. exponentially small in some chosen
security parameter) knowledge. Despite of the simple idea, proofs taking into account all
eavesdropping attacks allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics have shown to be techni-
cally involved [5, 6, 7]. Recently, Shor and Preskill [8] have given a simpler physical proof
relating the ideas in [5, 6] to quantum error correcting codes [9] and, equivalently, to one-
way entanglement purification protocols. Quantum privacy amplification (QPA) [10], on
the other hand, employs a two-way entanglement purification recurrence protocol [11] that
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2eliminates any entanglement with an eavesdropper by creating a few perfect EPR pairs out
of many imperfect (or impure) EPR pairs. The perfect EPR pairs can then be used for se-
cure key distribution in entanglement-based quantum cryptography [2, 10, 12]. In principle,
this method guarantees security against any eavesdropping attack. However, the problem
is that the QPA protocol assumes ideal quantum operations. In reality, these operations
are themselves subject to noise. As shown in [13, 14, 15], there is an upper bound Fmax for
the achievable fidelity of EPR pairs which can be distilled using noisy apparatus. A priori,
there is no way to be sure that there is no residual entanglement with an eavesdropper. This
problem could be solved if Alice and Bob had fault tolerant quantum computers at their
disposal, which could then be used to reduce the noise of the apparatus to any desired level.
This was an essential assumption in the security proof given by Lo and Chau [16].
In this paper, we show that the standard two-way entanglement purification protocols
alone, which have been developed by Bennett at al. [11, 17] and later by Deutsch et al. [10],
with some minor modifications to accomodate certain security aspects as discussed below,
can be used to efficiently establish a perfectly private quantum channel, even when both the
physical channel connecting the parties and the local apparatus used by Alice and Bob are
noisy.
In Section II we will briefly review the concepts of entanglement purification. Section
III will give the main result of our work: we prove that it is possible to factor out an
eavesdropper using EPP, even when the apparatus used by Alice and Bob is noisy. We
conclude the paper with a discussion in Section IV.
II. ENTANGLEMENT PURIFICATION
As two-way entanglement purification protocols (2–EPP) play an important role in this
paper, we will briefly review one example of a a recurrence protocol which was described
in [10], and called quantum privacy amplification (QPA) by the authors. It is important to
note that we distinguish the entanglement purification protocol from the distillation process :
the first consists of probabilistic local operations (unitary rotations and measurements),
where two pairs of qubits are combined, and either one or zero pairs are kept, depending
on the measurement outcomes. The latter, on the other hand, is the procedure where the
purification protocol is applied to large ensemble of pairs recursively (see Fig. (1)).
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FIG. 1: The entanglement purification protocol (a) and the entanglement distillation process (b).
In the quantum privacy amplification 2–EPP, two pairs of qubits, shared by Alice and
Bob, are considered to be in the state ρA1B1 ⊗ ρA2B2 . Without loss of generality (see later),
3we may assume that the state of the pairs is of the Bell-diagonal form,
ρAB = A
∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣+B ∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣+ C ∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+D ∣∣Φ−〉〈Φ−∣∣ . (1)
Following [10], the protocol consists of three steps:
1. Alice applies to her qubits a π/2 rotation, Ux, Bob a −π/2 rotation about the x axis,
U−1x .
2. Alice and Bob perform the bi-lateral CNOT operation
BCNOTA2B2A1B1 = CNOT
A2
A1
⊗ CNOTB2B1
on the four qubits.
3. Alice and Bob measure both qubits of the target pair A2B2 of the BCNOT operation
in the z direction. If the measurement results coincide, the source pair A1B1 is kept,
otherwise it is discarded. The target pair is always discarded, as it is projected onto
a product state by the bilateal measurement.
By a straigtforward calculation, one gets the result that the state of the remaining pair
is still a Bell diagonal state, with the diagonal coefficients [10]
A′ =
A2 +B2
N
, B′ =
2CD
N
C ′ =
C2 +D2
N
, D′ =
2AB
N
,
(2)
and the normalization coefficient N = (A + B)2 + (C +D)2, which is the probability that
Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results in step 3 coincide. Note that, up to the normalization,
these recurrence relations are a quadratic form in the coefficients A,B,C, and D. These
relations allow for the following interpretation (which can be used to obtain the relations (2)
in the first place): As all pairs are in the Bell diagonal state (1), one can interpret A,B,C,
and D as the relative frequencies in the ensemble of all pairs of the states |Φ+〉 , |Ψ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 ,
and |Φ−〉, respectively. By looking at (2) one finds that the result of combining two |Φ+〉
or two |Ψ−〉 pairs is a |Φ+〉 pair, combining a |Ψ+〉 and a |Φ−〉 (or vice versa) yields a
|Ψ−〉 pair, and so on. Combinations of A,B,C, and D that do not occur in (2), namely
AC, AD, BC and BD, are “filtered out”, i. e. they give different measurement results for
the bilateral measurement in step 3 of the protocol. We will use this way of calculating
recurrence relations for more complicated situations later.
Numerical calculations [10] and, later, an analytical investigation [18] have shown that
for all initial states (1) with A > 1/2, the recurrence relations (2) approach the fixpoint
A = 1, B = C = D = 0; this means that given a sufficiently large number of initial pairs,
Alice and Bob can distill asymptotically pure EPR pairs.
III. FACTORIZATION OF EVE
In the previous section it has been assumed that Alice and Bob have perfect apparatus at
their disposal, which they use to execute the protocol. For the following security analysis, we
4shall consider a more general scenario where this assumption is abandoned. As mentioned in
the introduction, there is an upper bound Fmax for the attainable fidelity of the distilled pairs,
when the apparatus used by Alice and Bob is noisy [13, 14]. For quantum cryptography the
question arises: can these imperfect pairs still be used for secure key distribution?
In this section we will show that 2–EPP with noisy apparatus is sufficient to factor out
Eve in the Hilbertspace of Alice, Bob, their labs and Eve. For the proof, we will first
introduce the concept of the lab demon as a simple model of noise. Then we will consider
the special case of binary pairs, where we have obtained analytical results. Using the same
techniques, we generalize the result to the case of Bell diagonal ensembles. The most general
case of correlated non Bell-diagonal can be reduced to the case of Bell diagonal states [19].
A. The effect of noise
In this section we will answer the following question: what is the effect of an error,
introduced by some noisy operation at a given point of the distillation process? To keep the
argument transparent, we restrict our attention to the following type of noise:
• It acts locally, i. e. noise does not introduce correlations between remote quantum
systems.
• Noise is memoryless, i. e. on a timescale imposed by the sequence of steps in a given
protocol, there are no correlations between the “errors” that occur at different times.
The action of noisy apparatus on a quantum system in state ρ ∈ B(H) can be formally
described by some trace conserving, completely positive map. Any such map can be written
in the operator-sum representation [4, 20],
ρ→
∑
i
AiρA
†
i , (3)
with linear operators Ai, that fulfill the normalization condition
∑
iAA
† = 1. The operators
Ai are the so-called Kraus operators [20].
As we have seen above, in the purification protocol the CNOT operation, which acts on
two qubits a and b, plays an important role. For that reason, it is necessary to consider
noise which acts on a two-qubit Hilbert space H = C2a ⊗ C2b . Eq. (3) describes the most
general non-selective operation that can, in principle, be implemented. For technical reasons,
however, we restrict our attention to the case that the Kraus operators are proportional to
products of Pauli matrices. The reason for this choice is that Pauli operators map Bell states
onto Bell states, which will allow us to introduce the very useful concept of error flags later.
Eq. (3) can then be written as
ρab →
3∑
µ,ν=0
fµνσ
(a)
µ σ
(b)
ν ρabσ
(a)
µ σ
(b)
ν , (4)
with the normalization condition
∑3
µ,ν=0 fµν = 1. Note that Eq. (4) includes, for an ap-
propriate choice of the coefficients fµν , the one- and two-qubit depolarizing channel and
combinations thereof, as studied in [13, 14]; but it is more general. Below, we will refer to
these special Kraus operators as error operators.
5The coefficients fµν can be interpreted as the joint probability that the Pauli rotations σµ
and σν occur on qubits a and b, respectively. For pedagogic purposes we employ the following
interpretation of (4): Imagine that there is a (ficticious) little demon in Alice’s laboratory –
the “lab demon” – which applies in each step of the distillation process randomly, according
to the probability distribution fµν , the Pauli rotation σµ and σν to the qubits a and b,
respectively. The lab demon summarizes all relevant aspects of the lab degrees of freedom
involved in the noise process.
Noise in Bob’s laboratory, can, as long as we restrict ourselves to Bell diagonal ensembles,
be attributed to noise introduced by Alice’s lab demon, without loss of generality. It is also
possible to think of a second lab demon in Bob’s lab who acts similarly to Alice’s lab demon.
This would, however, not affect the arguments employed in this paper.
The lab demon does not only apply rotations randomly, he also maintains a list in which
he keeps track of which rotation he has applied to which qubit pair in which step of the
distillation process. What we will show in the following section is that, from the mere content
of this list, the lab demon will be able to extract – in the asymptotic limit – full information
about the state of each residual pair of the ensemble. This will then imply that, given the
lab demons knowledge about the flags, the state of the distilled ensemble is a tensor product
of pure Bell states. Eve cannot not have information on the specific sequence of Bell pairs
(in addition to their relative frequencies) — otherwise she would also be able to learn, to
some extent, at which stage the lab demon has applied which rotation.
From that it follows that Eve is factored out, i. e. Alice and Bob describe their pairs with
the state
ρABEL =
(
1∑
i,j=0
f
(i,j)
L |Bi,j〉AB〈Bi,j |
)
⊗ ρE. (5)
It remains to be shown that the same argument applies to a realistic scenario where the
lab demon is replaced by some “real” noise source. To be specific, in the following argument
we show that all quantum or classical devices that share the same noise characteristics are
equally secure. First we note that a communication protocol is secure if and only if there
exists no eavesdropping strategy; this fact can, in priciple, be determined by cooperating
communication parties. On the other hand, all devices with identical noise caracteristics
are quantum mechanically described by the same completely positive trace conserving map,
so that a initial state ρi is mapped onto a final state ρf , independend from the physical
realization of the map. This means that there is no way do distinguish the devices by only
looking at the input and output states. For the case of noisy apparatus that is used for
entanglement purification we get thus the following result: a device the implements (4)
with a lab demon cannot be distinguished from any device that introduces noise due to
some “real” noise source; in particular, the devices must lead to the same level of security
(regardless whether or not error flags are measured or calculated by anybody): otherwise
they would be distinguishable.
In order to separate conceptual from technical considerations and to obtain analytical
results, we will first concentrate on the special case of binary pairs and a simplified error
model. After that, we generalize the results to ensembles which are diagonal in the Bell
basis.
6B. Binary pairs
In this section we restrict our attention to pairs in the state
ρAB = A
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
〈
Φ+
∣∣ +B ∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
〈
Ψ+
∣∣ , (6)
and to errors of the form
ρ
(1)
AB ⊗ ρ(2)AB →
∑
µ,ν∈{0,1}
fµνU
(1)
µ U
(2)
ν ρ
(1)
AB ⊗ ρ(2)ABU (1)µ
†
U (2)ν
†
(7)
with U
(1,2)
0 = id
(1,2) and U
(1,2)
1 = σx
(1,2). Eq. (7) describes a two-bit correlated spin-flip
channel. The indices 1 and 2 indicate the source and target bit of the bilateral CNOT
(BCNOT) operation, respectively. It is straightforward to show that, using this error model
in the 2–EPP, binary pairs will be mapped onto binary pairs.
At the beginning of the distillation process, Alice and Bob share an ensemble of pairs
described by (6). Let us imagine that the lab demon attaches one classical bit to each pair,
which he will use for book-keeping purposes. At this stage, all of these bits, which we call
“error flags”, are set to zero. This reflects the fact that the lab demon has the same a priori
knowledge about the state of the ensemble as Alice and Bob.
In each purification step, two of the pairs are combined. The lab demon first simulates
the noise channel (7) on each pair of pairs by the process described. Whenever he applies
a σx operation to a qubit, he inverts the error flag of the corresponding pair. Alice and
Bob then apply the 2–EPP to each pair of pairs; if the measurement results in the last
step of the protocol coincide, the source pair will be kept. Obviously, the error flag of that
remaining pair will also depend on the error flag of the the target pair, i. e. the error flag of
the remaining pair is a function of the error flags of both “parent” pairs, which we call the
flag update function. Since for binary pairs the error flag consists of one bit, there are 16
different flag update functions in total. From these, the lab demon chooses the logical AND
function as the flag update function, i. e. the error flag of the remaining pair is set to “1” if
and only if both parent’s error flags had the value “1”.
After each purification step, the lab demon divides all pairs into two subensembles, ac-
cording to the value of their error flags. By a straightforward calculation, one finds for the
coefficients Ai and Bi, which completely describe the state of the pairs in the subensemble
i, the following recurrence relations:
A′0 =
1
N
(f00(A
2
0 + 2A0A1) + f11(B
2
1 + 2B0B1)
+ fs(A0B1 + A1B1 + A0B0))
A′1 =
1
N
(
f00A
2
1 + f11B
2
0 + fsA1B0
)
B′0 =
1
N
(f00(B
2
0 + 2B0B1) + f11(A
2
1 + 2A0A1)
+ fs(B0A1 +B1A1 +B0A0))
B′1 =
1
N
(
f00B
2
1 + f11A
2
0 + fsB1A0
)
(8)
with N = (f00 + f11)((A0 +A1)
2 + (B0 +B1)
2) + 2fs(A0 +A1)(B0 +B1) and fs = f01 + f10.
7For the case of uncorrelated noise, fµν = fµfν , we find an analytical expression for the
relevant fixpoint of the map (8):
A∞0 =
4f 20 − 4f0 + (2f0 − 1)
√
4f0 − 3 + 1
2(2f0 − 1)2 ,
A∞1 = 0, B
∞
0 = 0, B
∞
1 = 1− A∞0 .
(9)
Note that, while Eq. (9) gives a fixpoint of (8) for f0 ≥ 3/4, this does not imply that
this fixpoint is an attractor. In order to investigate the attractor properties, we calculate
the eigenvalues of the matrix of first derivatives,
MD =


∂A′
0
∂A0
· · · ∂B′1
∂A0
...
. . .
...
∂A′
0
∂B1
· · · ∂B′1
∂B1


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
fixpoint
. (10)
We found that the modulus of the eigenvalues of this matrix is smaller than unity for
f crit0 = 0.77184451 < f0 ≤ 1, which means that in this interval, the fixpoint (9) is also an
attractor. This is in excellent agreement with a numerical evaluation of (8), where we found
that 0.77182 < f crit0 < 0.77188.
We also evaluated (8) numerically in order to investigate correlated noise (see Fig. 2).
Like in the case of uncorrelated noise, we found that the coefficients A0 and B1 reach,
during the distillation process, some finite value, while the coefficients A1 and B0 decrease
exponentially fast, whenever the noise level is moderate.
In other words, both subensembles, characterized by the value of the respective error
flags, approach a pure state asymptotically. The pairs in the ensemble with error flag “0”
are in the state |Φ+〉, while those in the ensemble with error flag “1” are in the state |Ψ+〉.
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FIG. 2: The evolution of the four parameters A0, A1, B0, and B1. Note that both A1 and B0
decrease exponentially fast in the number of steps.
To conclude this section, we summarize: For a large region 0.77184451 ≡ f crit0 ≤ f0 ≤ 1
the 2–EPP purifies and at the same time any eavesdropper is factored out. For a small
region 0.75 < f0 < f
crit
0 ≡ 0.77184451, close to the threshold of the purification protocol,
the conditional fidelity does not reach unity, while the protocol is in the purification regime.
Even though the region is small and of little practical relevance (in this regime we are already
8out of the repeater regime [13] and purification is very inefficient), its existence shows that
the process of factorization is an independent phenomenon and not trivially connected to
EPP. A more exhaustive description of the intermediate regime will be published elsewhere.
C. Bell diagonal initial states
Now we want to show that the same result is true for arbitrary Bell diagonal states
(Eq. (1)) and for noise of the form (4). The procedure is the same as in the case of binary
pairs; however, a few modifications are required.
In order to keep track of the four different error operators σµ in (4), the lab demon has
to attach two classical bits to each pair; let us call them the phase error bit and amplitude
error bit. Whenever a σx (σz, σy) error occurs, the lab demon inverts the error amplitude bit
(error phase bit, both error bits). To update these error flags, he uses the update function
given in Tab. I). The physical reason for the choice of the flag update function will be given
in the next section.
(00) (01) (10) (11)
(00) (00) (00) (00) (10)
(01) (00) (01) (11) (00)
(10) (00) (11) (01) (00)
(11) (10) (00) (00) (00)
TABLE I: The value (phase error,amplitude error) of the updated error flag of a pair that is kept
after a 2–EPP step, given as a function of the error flags of P1 and P2 (left to right and top to
bottom, respectively).
Here, the lab demon divides all pairs into four subensembles, according to the value of
their error flag. In each of the subensembles the pairs are described by a Bell diagonal
density operator, like in Eq. (1), which now depends on the subensemble. That means, in
order to completely specify the state of all four subensembles, there are 16 real numbers
Aij , Bij, Cij, Dij with i, j ∈ {0, 1} required, for which one obtaines recurrence relations of
the form
A(00)n → A(00)n+1(A(00)n , A(01)n , . . . , D(11)n ),
A(01)n → A(01)n+1(A(00)n , A(01)n , . . . , D(11)n ),
...
D(11)n → D(11)n+1(A(00)n , A(01)n , . . . , D(11)n ).
(11)
These generalize the recurrence relations (8) for the case of binary pairs, and the relations
(2) for the case of noiseless apparatus.
Like the recurrence relations (2) and (8), respectively, these relations are (modulo nor-
malization) quadratic forms in the 16 state variables ~a =
(
A(00), A(00), . . . , D(11)
)T
, with
coefficients that depend on the error parameters fµν only. In other words, (11) can be
written in the more compact form
~a′j = ~aMj~a
T , (12)
9FIG. 3: The evolution of the extended state
where, for each j ∈ {1, . . . 16},Mj is a real 16×16-matrix whose coefficients are polynomials
in the noise parameters fµν .
D. Numerical results
The 16 recurrence relations (11) imply a reduced set of 4 recurrence relations for the
quantities An =
∑
ij A
(ij)
n , . . . , Dn =
∑
ij D
(ij)
n which describe the evolution of the total
ensemble (that is, the blend [21] of the four subensembles) under the purification protocol.
Note that these values are the only ones which are known and accessible to Alice and Bob,
as they have no knowledge of the values of the error flags. It has been shown in [13] that
under the action of the noisy entanglement distillation process, these quantities converge
towards a fixpoint (A∞, B∞, C∞, D∞), where A∞ = Fmax is the maximal attainable fidelity
[14].
Fig. 3 shows for typical initial conditions the evolution of the 16 coefficients A
(00)
n . . .D
(11)
n .
They are organized in a 4 × 4-matrix, where one direction represents the Bell state of the
pair, and the other indicates the value of the error flag. The figure shows the state (a) at
the beginning of the entanglement purification procedure, (b) after few purification steps,
and (c) at the fixpoint. As one can see, initially all error flags are set to zero and the
pairs are in a Werner state with a fidelity of 70%. After a few steps, the population of the
diagonal elements starts to grow; however, none of the elements vanishes. At the fixpoint,
all off-diagonal elements vanish, which means that there are strict correlations between the
states of the pairs and their error flags.
In order to determine how fast the state converges, we investigate two important
quantities: the first is the fidelity Fn ≡ An, and the second is the conditional fidelity
F condn ≡ A(00)n + B(11)n + C(01)n + D(10)n . Note that the first quantity is the sum over the
four |Φ+〉 components in Fig. 3, while the latter is the sum over the four diagonal elements.
The conditional fidelity is the fidelity which Alice and Bob would assign to the pairs if they
knew the values of the error flags, i. e.
F condn =
∑
i,j
〈
Φ+
∣∣ σi,jρi,jσi,j ∣∣Φ+〉 , (13)
where ρi,j is the non-normalized state of the subensemble of the pairs with the error flag
(i, j). For convenience, we used the phase- and spin-flip bits i and j as indices for the Pauli
matrices, i. e. σ00 = Id, σ01 = σx, σ11 = σy, σ10 = σz .
The results that we obtain are similar to those for the binary pairs. We can also distin-
guish three regimes of noise parameters fµν . In the high-noise regime (i. e., small values of
10
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FIG. 4: (a) The fidelities F and Fcond as a function of the number of steps in the entanglement
distillation process (analytical results (lines) and Monte Carlo simulation (circles)). For the calcu-
lation, one and two qubit white noise with a noise fidelity of 97% has been assumed. The Monte
Carlo simulation was started with 10000000 pairs; the numbers indicate how many pairs are left
after each step of the distillation process. This decreasing number is the reason for the increasing
fluctuations around the analytical curves.
f00), the noise level is above the threshold of the 2–EPP and the fidelity F and the con-
ditional fidelity F cond converge both to the value 0.25. In the low-noise regime (i. e., large
values of f00), F converges to the maximum fidelity Fmax and F
cond converges to unity (see
Fig. 4). This regime is the security regime, where we know that secure quantum communi-
cation is possible. Like for binary pairs, there exists also an intermediate regime, where the
2–EPP purifies but F cond does not converge to unity. For an illustration, see Fig 5. Note that
the size of the intermediate regime is very small, compared to the security regime. Whether
or not secure quantum communication is possible in this regime is unknown. However, the
answer of this question is irrelevant for all practical purposes, because in the intermediate
regime the distillation process converges very slowly. A detailed discussion of the situation
near the purification threshold will be published at some other place.
Even though the intermediate regime is practically irrelevant, it is important to estimate
its size. For simplicity, we considered the case of one-qubit white noise, i.e. fµν = fµfν and
f1 = f2 = f3 = (1− f0)/3. Here, this regime is known to be bounded by
0.8983 < f crit,lower < f0 < f
crit,upper < 0.8988.
Regarding the efficiency of the distillation process, it is an important question how many
initial pairs are needed to create one pair with the security parameter ǫ ≡ 1−F cond. Both the
number of required initial pairs (resources) and the security parameter scale exponentially
with the number of distillation steps, so that we expect a polynomial relation between the
resources and the security parameter ǫ. Fig. 6 shows this relation in a log-log plot for
different noise parameters. The straight lines are fitted polynomial relations; the fit region
is indicated by the lines themselves.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have shown in the preceeding section, that the two-way entanglement distillation
process is able to disentangle any eavesdropper from Bell pairs distributed between Alice
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FIG. 5: The size and the location of the three regimes of the distillation process. For fixed values
of f00, the remaining 15 noise parameters fµν have been choosen at random. Plotted is the relative
frequency of finding the noise parameters in any of the three regimes as a function of f00.
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and Bob, even in the presence of noise, i. e. when the pairs can only be purified up to a
specific maximun fidelity Fmax < 1. Alice and Bob may use them as a secure quantum
communication channel. They are thus able to perform secure quantum communication,
and, as a special case, secure classical communication (which is in this case equivalent to a
key distribution scheme).
In order to keep the argument transparent, we first considered the case where noise of
the form (4) is explicitly introduced by a fictious lab-demon, who keeps track of all error
operations and performs calculations. However, using a simple indistinguishability argument
(see Section IIIA), we could show that any apparatus with the noise characteristics (4) is
equally secure as a situation where noise in introduced by the lab demon. This means that
the security of the protocol does not depend on the fact whether or not anybody actually
calculates the flag update function. It is sufficient to just use a noisy 2–EPP, in order to get
a secure quantum channel.
For the proof, we had to make several assumptions on the noise that acts in Alices and
Bobs entanglement purification device. One restriction is that we only considered noise which
is of the form (4). However, this restriction is only due to technical reasons; we conjecture
that our results are also true for most general noise models of the form (3). We have also
implicitly introduced the assumption that the eavesdropper has no additional knowledge
about the noise process, i. e. Eve only knows the publicly known noise characteristics (4)
of the apparatus. This assumption would not be justified, for example, if the lab demon
was bribed by Eve, or if Eve was able to manipulate the apparatus in Alice’s and Bob’s
laboratories, for example by shining in light from an optical fiber. This concern is not
important from a principial point of view, as the laboratories of Alice and Bob are considered
secure by assumption. On the other hand, this concern has to be taken into account in any
practical implementation.
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